

TYPE SCRIPT
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Key Soviet Statements on START

Key Soviet Statements on INF

Key Soviet Statements on MBFR

Key Soviet Statements on Countermeasures to Western Arms Programs

Key Soviet Statements on the Military Balance

Background enclosed

18 JANUARY 1983

KEY SOVIET STATEMENTS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

(1979 - 1983)

- 25 October 1979 Writing in PRAVDA, Defense Minister Ustinov charged that Washington had intensified its "military preparations" since the Vienna SALT II summit and initiated strategic weapons programs aimed at achieving a "preventive strike" capability.
- 15 May 1980 Warsaw Pact leaders meeting in Warsaw accused the U.S. of acting "contrary to the interests of international trust and detente" by deferring ratification of the SALT II treaty.
- 22 February 1981 In his speech to the 26th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev called for retention of "everything positive" from past strategic arms negotiations, without mentioning SALT II, and affirmed Moscow's readiness to begin talks with the new U.S. Administration "without delay."
- 2 November 1981 In a widely publicized interview with a West German weekly, Brezhnev said Moscow had done nothing since the 1979 U.S.-Soviet summit to disturb the "rough parity" in strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. He reaffirmed Moscow's preference for "national means" of verification but said "other forms of verification might be worked out" under the right conditions.
- 18 May 1982 In a Moscow speech, Brezhnev applauded the imminent resumption of strategic arms talks (START) as a "step in the right direction," repeating the Soviet position that a new accord should preserve "everything positive" in earlier rounds. Brezhnev proposed that U.S. and Soviet strategic force levels be "frozen" and their modernization "limited to the utmost" while the talks proceeded.
- 22 June 1982 At a Moscow press conference, Foreign Minister Gromyko criticized President Reagan's START proposals as one-sided because of their focus on ICBM's and their omission in the first stage of strategic bombers and cruise missiles.
- 21 October 1982 At a meeting in Moscow with Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, Brezhnev said the START talks were "proceeding with difficulty" owing to "U.S. unwillingness to reach an agreement on a fair basis."
- 21 December 1982 General Secretary Andropov, speaking on the USSR's 60th anniversary, revealed details of Moscow's START proposal and expressed readiness to consider confidence-building measures like those suggested by President Reagan in a November speech.

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KEY SOVIET STATEMENTS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

(1979 - 1983)

- 6 October 1979 . . . Speaking in East Berlin, Brezhnev offered to reduce Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European USSR if NATO canceled plans to deploy U.S. intermediate-range missiles, followed by a call in PRAVDA the next month for immediate negotiations.
- 13 January 1980 . . . Brezhnev asserted in a PRAVDA interview that NATO's December 1979 decision to proceed with deployment of U.S. missiles "makes talks on this problem impossible."
- 4 July 1980 . . . A joint USSR party-government statement issued following FRG Chancellor Schmidt's talks in Moscow abandoned the Soviet demand that NATO cancel or suspend its December 1979 modernization decision before INF talks begin but specified that American forward-based aircraft be discussed "simultaneously and in organic connection" with intermediate-range missile weapons.
- 23 November 1981 . . . Brezhnev, speaking in Bonn, urged Washington to abandon its "zero option" proposal for the INF talks and suggested a mutual moratorium on new missile deployments while talks are under way. He again offered to unilaterally reduce part of the Soviet intermediate-range arsenal in the European USSR in connection with a moratorium.
- 16 March 1982 . . . Brezhnev, speaking in Moscow, announced a unilateral moratorium on further SS-20 missile deployments. He stated that the moratorium would be in effect until an INF agreement was reached or NATO began "practical preparations" to deploy U.S. missiles.
- 21 December 1982 . . . CPSU General Secretary Andropov, speaking at the USSR's 60th anniversary celebration in Moscow, offered to reduce Soviet missiles aimed at Europe to a level equal to those of Britain and France if NATO abstained from deployment of U.S. missiles. He dropped earlier Soviet insistence that missiles and aircraft be included in the same agreement.

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KEY SOVIET STATEMENTS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE (MBFR)

(1979 - 1983)

- 17 June 1979 Brezhnev, in a dinner speech during the Vienna SALT II Summit, said his talks with President Carter showed that both sides wanted to expedite the work of the Vienna MBFR talks in reaching agreement on force reductions.
- 23 February 1981 Brezhnev, speaking at the 26th CPSU Congress, said that Moscow and its allies had gone "more than half way" to meet the views of the Western states in the MBFR talks but the NATO side "drags out" the talks while building up its military potential in Europe.
- 24 July 1981 Defense Minister Ustinov, writing in PRAVDA, charged that the United States had "blocked" progress at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna by "juggling" data on the troop strength of the two sides, which, he claimed, were "approximately equal."
- 1 October 1982 Foreign Minister Gromyko, addressing the 37th UN General Assembly session in New York, said that after nine years an agreement at the MBFR talks was "long overdue" and the Warsaw Pact was doing its "utmost" to achieve progress through its proposals for equal levels of forces in Central Europe.
- 6 January 1983 Warsaw Pact leaders, meeting in Prague, issued a declaration expressing the belief that conditions exist for reaching agreement in Vienna within "not more than one or two years." They proposed U.S.-Soviet reductions followed by a "freeze" on force levels of all "direct participants" pending future agreement on "further, large reductions."

18 JANUARY 1983

KEY SOVIET STATEMENTS ON COUNTERMEASURES TO WESTERN ARMS PROGRAMS

(1979 - 1983)

- 6 October 1979 In East Berlin, Brezhnev warned that NATO deployment of intermediate-range missiles would force Moscow to take the "necessary extra steps" needed to strengthen the Warsaw Pact's security. He warned West German leaders that if new missiles appeared in their country, the security of the FRG would "considerably worsen."
- 2 November 1981 Brezhnev, in a widely publicized interview with a West German weekly, said that West Europe was faced by "vast dangers" from the NATO missile plan. To neutralize mobile missiles, he said, would require Moscow to deal "retaliatory strikes of great yield" at their deployment sites.
- 16 March 1982 In Moscow, Brezhnev said that NATO deployment of new missiles in Europe would create an "additional threat" to Soviet security and compel the Soviet Union to take "retaliatory steps" that would place the "United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position."
- 21 December 1982 Andropov, speaking at the USSR 60th anniversary celebration in Moscow, stated that new American weapons systems would provoke "corresponding" Soviet systems in reply, including "an analogous missile to the MX and our own long-range cruise missile."
- 17 January 1983 Foreign Minister Gromyko, speaking during a visit to Bonn, said implementation of NATO's decision would force Moscow to draw the "corresponding conclusions" to maintain the military balance, noting the fact that the FRG is "the only state" where new Pershing II missiles would be deployed.

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KEY SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THE MILITARY BALANCE

(1977 - 1978)

- 18 January 1977 In a speech near Moscow, Brezhnev for the first time directly denied allegations in the West that the USSR's continuing military buildup signaled a "striving for military superiority."
- 2 November 1977 In his speech on the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev for the first time endorsed military balance, asserting, "We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength existing at present, say between East and West in central Europe or between the USSR and the United States."
- 3 May 1978 In an "interview" published in Soviet papers on the eve of his visit to the FRG, Brezhnev endorsed "approximate equality and parity" as sufficient for Soviet defensive needs, a point also included in the joint USSR-FRG communique signed by Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Schmidt on the 6th.

19 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Bert -

Included are the five typescripts we agreed to prepare for the Vice-President's briefing package. Let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Chief, Soviet Foreign Policy Br.
Analysis Group
FBIS

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Date

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS

10. LOGNOTE - Analysis Group, 18 January 1983

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[] ASSISTANCE FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH. [] chief of the Strategic/Internal branch in SOVA's Current Support Division, called me yesterday to request assistance in responding to a request from Vice President Bush's office for briefing materials to prepare for the Vice President's coming trip to Europe. Among other things, Bush's office had asked for key statements from the Soviets over the last five years on START, INF, and MBFR and threats of retaliatory measures against U.S. deployments. Bert thought AG would be in the best position to answer that part of the request. We agreed that AG would provide separate typescript compilations on each of the issues by the morning of 19 January for inclusion in the package of materials being sent to the Vice President's office. [] took primary responsibility for developing our response, with participation by [] and myself.

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(cc: D/FBIS, C/LRB)